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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

TROY JOSEPH ARCHULETTA

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20070528-CA

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from first-degree felony
convictions upon transfer from the Utah Supreme Court. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), §
78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). The Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction over all other
criminal appeals from courts of record pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(e) (2002).
Pursuant to rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Utah Supreme Court
transferred Troy Joseph Archuletta's appeal on July 16, 2007.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Where Archuletta's conduct violated nearly identical provisions of Utah's criminal
trespass and burglary statutes, thereby precluding a burglary conviction as a matter of
law, and where burglary is an essential element of aggravated burglary, did the trial court
err in refusing to reduce the charge of aggravated burglary to criminal trespass?
Standards of Review: The appellate court reviews a claim that two statutes
proscribe the same conduct, thus prohibiting the prosecutor from charging the crime with

the higher penalty or classification "under a correction-of-error standard, according no
particular deference to the trial court's ruling." State v. Green, 2000 UT App 33, \ 5, 995
P.2d 1250 (quoting State v. Kent, 945 P.2d 145, 146 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)).
Preservation: Archuletta5 s trial counsel moved for reduction of the aggravated
burglary charge to criminal trespass at the close of the state's case-in-chief. R. 191:12936.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The U.S. Const., Amend XIV, § 1, Utah Const. Art. I, § 24, Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-202 (2003) (burglary), Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (2003), (aggravated burglary),
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (Supp. 2007) (criminal trespass), Utah Code Ann. § 76-5102 (2003) (assault), and Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (Supp. 2007) (definitions), are
attached as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Archuletta was charged by information with aggravated burglary, a first-degree
felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (2003), and simple assault, a class A
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (2003). R. 1-3. He was bound
over for trial following a preliminary hearing. R. 27-28. A jury found Archuletta guilty
on both charges. R. 172.
The court sentenced Archuletta to serve five years to life at the Utah State Prison
on the first degree felony conviction, and suspended the sentence. It sentenced
Archuletta to 365 days in jail on the class A misdemeanor conviction, and suspended one
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day. It imposed a thirty-six month term of probation, including the 364-day jail term. R.
176-78. The sentencing order is attached as Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Archuletta was a passenger in a car with three others. R. 191:139. They passed a
motel where Archuletta saw a car resembling the car that belongs to his mother and her
boyfriend. R. 191:140. The boyfriend, Dave Florez, and Archuletta's mother had been
dating for five years. R. 191:137-38. Archuletta knew the boyfriend for this entire fiveyear period. Id. Archuletta became excited at seeing the car because he had not seen or
heard from his mother for approximately thirty days. R. 191:138. He asked the driver to
turn around and pull into the motel parking lot. R. 191:140-41.
Archuletta got out of the car and approached a woman standing at the doorway of
the motel room next to which the other car was parked. R. 191:141 -43. Unbeknownst to
Archuletta at the time, another male passenger also exited the car and followed
Archuletta. R. 191:142 (Archuletta did not ask anyone to come with him); 148
(Archuletta did not notice that the other male had followed him until Archuletta prepared
to leave the motel room).
Archuletta asked the woman standing near the hotel room if she knew who owned
the car. R. 191:142-43. The woman asked why he wanted to know about the car. R.
191:142. Archuletta looked through the open motel room door and saw some of his
mother's "stuff," and also saw his mother's boyfriend sitting on the bed. R. 191:142,
143. Archuletta entered the motel room. R. 191:150. It was disputed whether the
woman told Archuletta not to enter the room. Compare R. 191:27 (she asked him not to
3

enter), with R. 191:150 (she said nothing after asking Archuletta why he wanted to know
about the parked car).
After the boyfriend and Archuletta exchanged greetings, R. 191:144, Archuletta
looked for his mother in the main room and in the adjoining bathroom, but did not find
her. R. 191:150. Archuletta sat on the bed next to the boyfriend. R. 191:146. Archuletta
asked the boyfriend where his mother was. R. 191:146-47. Archuletta's mother has
Parkinson's disease and he feels very protective of her. Id.
The boyfriend said he and Archuletta's mother were no longer together. R.
191:147. The boyfriend said she had "ran off with some other guy," adding, "You know
how your mother is." Id. Archuletta and boyfriend exchanged words at this point, with
Archuletta maintaining that the boyfriend called Archuletta's mother a "whore."
Compare R. 191:88-91 (the boyfriend did not call Archuletta's mother a whore), with R.
191:147 (the boyfriend did call her a whore).
This exchange of words concerning his mother "hurt" Archuletta. While both
were still sitting on the bed, Archuletta struck the boyfriend, once, in the nose. R.
191:147-48. Archuletta then left the motel room. R. 191:148. The boyfriend's nose
required surgery. R. 191:98.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The aggravated burglary charge should have been reduced to criminal trespass.
The defendant's conduct violated nearly identical provisions of Utah's criminal
trespass and burglary statutes. Where the elements in two statutes are identical, equal
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protection of the law requires that the defendant face the statute of lower classification or
lesser punishment. Archuletta, therefore, could not have been convicted of burglary.
Burglary is an essential element of aggravated burglary. A defendant cannot be
convicted of aggravated burglary unless it is determined beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed burglary.
In this case, Archuletta could not have been convicted of burglary as a matter of
law. Because burglary is an essential element of aggravated burglary, the aggravated
burglary conviction is invalid.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO REDUCE THE FELONY CHARGE TO
CRIMINAL TRESPASS.
Because Archuletta could not have been convicted of burglary pursuant to equal
protection guarantees, and burglary is an essential element of aggravated burglary, the
court should have reduced the aggravated burglary charge to criminal trespass.1
Equal protection of the law requires "that the exact same conduct is not subject to
different penalties depending upon which of two statutory sections a prosecutor chooses
to charge." State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985). Long established is the
principle that "the prosecutor should not be given a choice of whether to proceed under a
felony statute or under a misdemeanor statute under the same set of facts." State v.
Twitchell, 333 P.2d 1075, 1077 (Utah 1959). This rule "requires that a prosecutor who
1

Archuletta also was convicted of assault, a class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (2003). R. 172. Therefore, Archuletta would still be punished for
punching the former boyfriend in the nose if aggravated burglary were reduced to
criminal trespass.
5

elects to charge an individual with a crime carrying a higher penalty or classification do
so knowing that the prosecutor will be required to prove at least one additional or
different element to obtain a conviction for the higher-penalty crime." State v.
Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, % 48, 52 P.3d 1194.
In this case, Archuletta was convicted for unlawfully entering a hotel room, and
then deciding to punch his mother's former boyfriend in the nose. R. 172 (record of
conviction); see R. 191:27 (hotel room resident told Archuletta not to enter); R. 191:14748 (Archuletta decided to hit the man when they were arguing about Archuletta's
mother). As established below, because Archuletta's conduct is punishable pursuant to
nearly identical provisions of Utah's criminal trespass and burglary statutes, equal
protection guarantees would have prohibited Archuletta's conviction for burglary.
The burglary statute states in pertinent part: "An actor is guilty of burglary if he
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to
commit... an assault on any person[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(l)(c) (2003). This
statute criminalizes Archuletta's conduct of unlawfully entering a hotel room and
deciding to punch a person in the nose.
The criminal trespass statute, in pertinent part, uses nearly identical language: "A
person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not amounting to burglary as
defined in Section 76-6-202 . . . he enters or remains unlawfully on property and intends
to cause . . . injury to any person[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2007).
Just as with the burglary statute, the criminal trespass statute criminalizes Archuletta's
unlawful entry and subsequent decision to punch a person in the nose.
6

The culpable state of mind for each crime also is the same: specific intent.
Compare State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 160 (Utah 1983) ("[C]riminal trespass [is] an
offense which itself requires a specific intent."), with State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 881
(Utah 1981) ("The elements of the crime of burglary are: (1) the act of entering the
building, and (2) the specific intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault therein."),
overruled on other grounds, see State v. Baker, 884 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Utah App. 1994).
In State v. Rudolph, the Utah Supreme Court held that so long as a defendant
unlawfully enters or remains in a building, it matters not whether the burglarious intent is
formed before or after entry. Id., 970 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1998). The Court also
rejected the defendant's claim that the burglary statute should be interpreted so that "one
who enters lawfully but then remains unlawfully and forms the intent to commit another
felony, theft, or assault is guilty of burglary while one who enters unlawfully and
thereafter forms that same intent is guilty only of trespass." Id. In so doing, however, the
Court did not disavow that "one . . . who enters unlawfully and thereafter forms
[burglarious intent]" may also be guilty of criminal trespass. See id. Nor did the
defendant assert, or the Court address, any claim that equal protection bars conviction for
a more serious crime when his conduct violates the nearly identical elements of a less
serious offense. See id.
Indeed, given the nearly identical language of the burglary and criminal trespass
statutes, at least as they relate to Archuletta's conduct, interpreting them differently
makes little sense. The only substantive difference between the two is that the burglary
statute criminalizes an unlawful entry combined with "intent to commit... an assault on
7

any person," while the criminal trespass statute criminalizes an unlawful entry combined
with "inten[t] to cause . . . injury to any person[.]" Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-6202(1 )(c) (burglary and "assault on any person"), with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6206(2)(a)(i) (criminal trespass and "injury to any person").
The difference between intending to commit "assault on any person" and
intending to cause "injury to any person" is one without a distinction. The crime of
assault referenced by the burglary statute requires as a threshold matter, "bodily injury to
another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1) (2003). Bodily injury, in turn, "means physical
pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(3)
(Supp. 2007).
Criminal trespass requires intent to cause at least "injury to any person." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2)(a)(i). Common sense dictates that "injury to any person" is
roughly synonymous with "bodily injury to another," which is the threshold requirement
for assault, § 76-5-102(1), and thus burglary, § 76-6-202(l)(c).
This means the prosecutor was not required to prove anything more severe to
obtain a burglary conviction ("bodily injury to another") than to obtain a criminal
trespass conviction ("injury to any person").

Assault is elevated from a class B to a class A misdemeanor upon infliction of
"substantial bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(3)(a). "Substantial bodily
injury" lies somewhere between "bodily injury" and "serious bodily injury." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-601(12) (defining "substantial bodily injury" as "bodily injury, not
amounting to serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain,
temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ"). Archuletta was convicted of class A assault. R. 172. This, however,
does not affect Archuletta's equal protection claim. Regardless of, and independent from
8

The Court's opinion in Rudolph also is instructive insofar as the defendant there
ultimately was convicted of aggravated burglary. Rudolph, 970 P.2d at 1224. In
deciding to affirm the defendant's aggravated burglary conviction, however, the Rudolph
Court first engaged in considerable analysis about whether the defendant's conduct
constituted burglary or criminal trespass. See id. at 1228-29. This was not because the
defendant was charged with burglary, but rather because burglary is an express element
of aggravated burglary:
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing,
or fleeing from a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime:
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime[.]
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203(l)(a) (2003). Thus a person may not be convicted of
aggravated burglary if the person was not "attempting, committing, or fleeing from a
burglary." Id.
Like the defendant in Rudolph, supra, Archuletta also was convicted of aggravated
burglary. R. 172. Thus the validity of the aggravated burglary conviction turns upon
whether Archuletta's unlawful entry and decision to punch someone could have been
punished as criminal trespass or burglary.

the separate assault conviction, the prosecutor was not required to prove anything more
severe to obtain a burglary conviction ("bodily injury to another") than to obtain a
criminal trespass conviction ("injury to any person").
Indeed, although Archuletta was charged with aggravated burglary, not burglary, the
jury was instructed on the elements of burglary. R. 164 (listing the "attempting,
committing or fleeing from a burglary" as an element of aggravated burglary); R. 167
(defining burglary: "When a person unlawfully enters a building with the intent to
commit an assault on any person, the crime of burglary is committed[.]").
9

Because the prosecutor in this case was not required to prove any additional
elements to establish burglary over criminal trespass, equal protection would prohibit
conviction on the more serious burglary charge. See Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67 at *fl 48.
As a matter of law, therefore, Archuletta could not be convicted of burglary.
Where Archuletta could not be convicted of burglary, his aggravated burglary
conviction is invalid because burglary is an essential element of aggravated burglary.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203(l)(a). Thus the trial court erred in refusing to reduce the
aggravated burglary charge to criminal trespass.
CONCLUSION
Archuletta's aggravated burglary conviction should be set aside or reduced to
criminal trespass.
DATED t h i s ^ day of September, 2007.

Pace
Lisa J. Remal
Attorneys for the Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I had hand-delivered an original and 7 copies of the foregoing
to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, 5th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114; and 4 copies to the Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East
300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114nthis Jl^1

day of September, 2007.

DELIVERED to the Utah Attorney General's Office and the Utah Court of
Appeals as indicated above this

day of December, 2006.
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Tab A

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

U.S. Const, Amend XIV, § 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the Unied States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall Make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nr deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Utah Const. Art. I, § 24: "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (2003), Burglary:
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit:
(a) a felony;
(b) theft;
(c) an assault on any person;
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1);
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3);
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5).
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree.
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses
listed in Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the
actor while he is in the building.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (2003), Aggravated burglary:
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or
fleeing from a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime:
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime;

(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any
person who is not a participant in the crime; or
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon.
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony.
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as
under Section 76-1-601.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (Supp. 2007), Criminal trespass:
(1) As used in this section, "enter" means intrusion of the entire body.
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not
amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76- 6204 or a violation of Section 76-10-2402 regarding commercial terrorism:
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any
property, including the use of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6-107;
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of
another;
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on
property as to which notice against entering is given by:
(i) personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone with
apparent authority to act for the owner;
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders; or
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders;
or
(c) he enters a condominium unit in violation of Subsection 57-8-7(7).
(3)(a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) or (b) is a class B misdemeanor unless
it was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class A misdemeanor.
(b) A violation of Subsection (2)(c) is an infraction.
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that:
(a) the property was open to the public when the actor entered or remained;
and
(b) the actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with the owner's use of
the property.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (2003), Assault:
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury
to another.
Utah Code Ann. $ 76-1-601 (Supp. 2007), Definitions:
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title:
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of
physical condition.
(11) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of
death.
(12) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to
serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain,
temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily member or organ.
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 061905136 FS

TROY JOSEPH ARCHULETTA,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

RANDALL SKANCHY
June 4, 2 0 07

PRESENT
Clerk:
marcyt
Reporter: MIDGLEY, ED
Prosecutor: BUETHE, LINDA F
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): REMAL, LISA J
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 10, 1970
Video
CHARGES
1. AGGRAVATED BURGLARY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/19/2007 Guilty
2. SIMPLE ASSAULT - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/19/2007 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
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Case No: 061905136
Date:
Jun 04, 2007

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of SIMPLE ASSAULT a Class A
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s)
The total time suspended for this charge is 1 day(s) .
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month (s) .
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant to serve 3 64 day(s) jail.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer.
Defendant is to serve 364 days.
Defendant is to have no further violations of law.
Defendant is to complete anger management and any other treatment
recommended.
Defendant is to pay restitution, the State has 60 days to determine
an amount.
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Case No: 061905136
Date:
Jun 04, 2 007
Defendant is to have full time work and report employment to APPD.
Dated this

If

day of \p>n.

, 20Q7 •

RANDALL SKEdSeHY
District Court
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